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Abstract 
[Excerpt] The immigration policy of the United States is steeped in legal complexities and is considered to 
be so politically combustible that most politicians are loathe to address the issue unless circumstances 
absolutely require them to act. In those instances when extant policies have become so incongruent with 
prevailing national interests that public pressure can no longer be ignored, the reform process has usually 
been preceded by the formation by Congress of a national commission or congressional panel to study 
the needs and to frame the appropriate policy responses before the professional politicians will touch the 
subject. Indeed, one would be hard-pressed to find another policy issue where the use of special 
commissions or committees has been so frequently used to identify policy shortcomings and to offer 
policy changes. Social security and welfare policies have sometimes relied on commissions to serve the 
same buffer role because they are also complex and controversial for politicians to address directly. But 
commissions were used to review immigration policy long before these other two public policies ever 
existed. 
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The Report of the Commission on Immigration 
Reform (i.e., the Jordan Commission) 
A Beacon for Real Immigration Reform 
By Vernon M. Briggs, Jr. 
The immigration policy of the United States is steeped in legal complexities and is considered to be so politically combustible that most politicians are loath to address the issue unless circumstances 
absolutely require them to act. In those instances when extant policies have 
become so incongruent with prevailing national interests that public pressure 
can no longer be ignored, the reform process has usually been preceded by 
the formation by Congress of a national commission or congressional panel 
to study the needs and to frame the appropriate policy responses before the 
professional politicians will touch the subject. Indeed, one would be hard-
pressed to find another policy issue where the use of special commissions or 
committees has been so frequently used to identify policy shortcomings and to 
offer policy changes [Briggs, pp.81-2; 110-13; 178-9; and 253-7]. 
Social security and welfare policies have sometimes relied on commissions 
to serve the same buffer role because they are also complex and controversial 
for politicians to address directly. But commissions were used to review 
immigration policy long before these other two public policies ever existed. 
Thus, when Congress and President George Herbert Walker Bush created the 
U.S. Commission on Immigration Reform as a provision in the Immigration 
Act of 1990, the move was not seen as an extraordinary event. Rather, it was 
viewed as but a normal part of the evolutionary process by which immigration 
policy is periodically reviewed and developed. 
But when the Commission issued its final report on September 30, 1997, 
its findings and recommendations were anything but routine [Commission 
(1997)]. Indeed, the work of this Commission was exceptional with respect to 
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the bipartisan nature of its efforts; the virtual unanimity of the panel over what reforms were needed; the 
factual support it garnered to justify its findings; and the cogency and relevancy of its recommendations 
for the accomplishment of real immigration reform. It is surprising, therefore, that with all of these positive 
characteristics when it came to the next step — the implementation phase of the reform process — that 
Congress and President Bill Clinton fumbled the ball. They ignored the signals given by the Commission 
about the vital importance of the subject matter and purposely chose not to act on the Commission's 
major recommendations. Maintenance of the status quo, which is what the special interests wanted, was 
allowed to prevail over serving the national interest as manifested by enacting the changes proffered by the 
Commission. Immigration reform has languished in the years since that time. All of the problems identified 
by the Commission were left unaddressed and have been allowed to fester. But the blueprint for real reform 
is all there — just waiting for true political leadership or a coalition of dedicated citizens to pick it up and 
follow the instructions. 
A Bipartisan Commission Reaches 
Conclusions that Were Virtually Unanimous 
A key factor in assessing the significance of the work of the Commission on Immigration Reform is the 
bipartisan nature of its membership. The Commission was composed of nine members — four members 
chosen by the leadership of the House of Representatives (two chosen by Republican leaders and two by 
Democratic leaders); four members were chosen by the leadership of the Senate (two by the Democratic 
leaders and two by the Republican leaders); and the Chair chosen by the President of the United States. 
None of the members of the Commission were elected officials at the time (although two members were 
former members of the House of Representatives). Originally, President Bush had selected Cardinal 
Bernard Law of Boston as Chair of the Commission. But after the presidential election of 1992 which saw 
Bush defeated for re-election, President Clinton exercised his option to choose the Chair and he appointed 
Barbara Jordan (a professor of public policy at the University of Texas at Austin at the time) to replace 
Cardinal Law in late 1993. Jordan, a former member of Congress, served in that capacity until her untimely 
death in January 1996 — the time span during which most of the Commission's work was done. In memory 
of her relentless efforts and influential leadership, the Commission's final report was dedicated by her 
colleagues to her public service. Shirley Hufstedler, an attorney from Los Angles, was chosen to wind-up 
the Commission's work and to issue the final report on September 30, 1997. Nevertheless, the Commission 
is popularly referred to as being the Jordan Commission because of the efforts put forth by Chairwoman 
Jordan as the public spokesperson for the Commission up to the time of her passing. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the Commission's membership was made up of five Democratic and four 
Republican appointees, the startling fact is that after more than five years of intensive study of this 
highly controversial policy matter, the Commission was unanimous in virtually all of its major policy 
recommendations (the only exception was an 8-1 vote in favor of reducing the annual level of legal 
immigration where the lone dissenting vote was cast by one of the Democratic appointees). Otherwise, this 
politically diverse commission was in virtually complete agreement over what immigration reforms were 
needed. 
The Basis for the Commission's Findings 
To conduct its assessment of the state of the nation's immigration policy, the Jordan Commission contracted 
18 original research papers on selected topics; held 13 consultations and 15 roundtables with government 
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and non-government experts and scholars; held eight public hearings across the country; and conducted 
seven site visits. 
In addition, the Commission requested in 1995 that the National Research Council (NRC) of the National 
Academy of Sciences convene a panel of experts to assess the demographic, economic, and fiscal 
consequences of the contemporary immigration phenomenon in the United States. The objective was "to lay 
a scientific foundation for policymaking on specific issues and to provide as rich a background as possible 
against which the Commission could do its work" [National Research Council, p.l]. In other words, it was 
to be a data-based study. The Jordan Commission provided the funding for the NRC's undertaking. 
A twelve member panel of nationally known economists, sociologists, and demographers was selected by 
the NRC's standing Committee on Population. It was called the Panel on the Demographic and Economic 
Impacts of Immigration. Being the product of a committee whose members wrote separate sections, the 
commentaries are sometimes analytically uneven between the chapters but its factual findings were crystal 
clear. 
The major findings of the NRC panel were that the educational attainment levels of post-1965 immigrants 
had steadily declined over the ensuing years. Consequently, foreign-born workers, on average, earn less 
than native-born workers and the gap between them was widening. The wages of immigrant workers from 
Latin America — who account for over half of the entire foreign-born population of the United States — 
were the lowest wages of all immigrant groups. The study, however, found no evidence discriminatory 
wages being paid to immigrants. Rather, immigrant workers were paid less because they were considerably 
less skilled than were native-born workers. The decline in both the skills and wages of the foreign-born 
population were attributed to the fact that most immigrants are coming from the poorer nations of the world 
where on average educational attainment levels, wages, and skill levels are far below those of the United 
States. Hence, as a consequence, the post-1965 immigrants have caused the low skilled segment of the 
nation's labor supply to swell. That is to say, immigrant workers on average are lowering the wages of all 
workers, with wages of low skilled workers — citizen and non-citizen alike — being lowered the most. 
The chief beneficiaries of immigration, on the other hand, are the immigrants themselves whose wages are 
still higher in the United States than they are in their homelands and the U.S. employers who are able to hire 
them at depressed wage levels. The greatest losers are the native-born workers who are low skilled and the 
American taxpayers since the study also found that the fiscal costs of immigration (i.e., the public costs of 
health care, welfare, incarceration, and education) far exceed the amount of taxes paid by the foreign-born 
population, leaving the native-born population to pick up the considerable deficit. 
The NRC study is without question the most comprehensive and the best documented study ever conducted 
of the impact of immigration on the U.S. economy and labor force. Although the Jordan Commission relied 
on the use of multiple sources of information, the detailed findings of the NRC study heavily influenced its 
conclusions and recommendations. 
The Conclusions and 
Recommendations of the Jordan Commission 
The Jordan Commission concluded that for both efficiency and equity reasons major changes were required 
if prevailing immigration policy was to become congruent with the national interest. Adults without a 
high school education and those with only a high school diploma consistently have the highest levels 
of unemployment and the highest incidences of poverty. Almost two-thirds of the adult foreign-born 
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population has less than a high school education or only a high school diploma. Unfortunately, almost 
half the adult population of the United States has these same low levels of educational attainment. Except 
where there is "a compelling national interest" to do so (i.e., the admission of "immediate family members" 
such as spouses, minor children, and parents of U.S. citizens as well those of refugees), the Commission 
concluded that it makes no sense for economic efficiency reasons to add to this pool by admitting other 
would-be adult immigrants to this large low-skilled labor pool. Likewise, equity considerations also require 
that "a higher level of job protections should be made available to the most vulnerable in our society" 
[Commission (1995), p.8]. Since so many of the adult immigrant population are poorly educated, it is the 
poorly educated and unskilled citizen and permanent resident segment of the nation's work force who bear 
the brunt of the "unfair competition" of the existing immigration admission system and its massive abuse 
by illegal immigrants. 
Accordingly, with respect to the legal immigration system, the Commission concluded that there is the need 
for "a significant redefinition" of admission priorities and a reallocation of the existing admission numbers 
[Commission (1997, p. XVII]. The Commission concluded that the present legal admission system be 
"shifted away from the extended family and toward the nuclear family and away from the unskilled and 
toward the higher-skilled immigrant" [Commission (1997), p. XVII]. To accomplish these changes, the 
Commission recommended the elimination of the existing family-based admission categories for adult 
unmarried sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; for adult sons and daughters of U.S. citizens; for adult, 
unmarried sons and daughters of legal permanent aliens; and for adult brothers and sisters of U.S. citizens. 
As for the employment-based admissions, the Commission recommended "the elimination of the admission 
category of unskilled workers" because the country already has a vast surplus of unskilled workers. In the 
same vein, the Commission also recommended the elimination of the diversity admission category (which 
only requires that the 50,000 persons who are selected each year by a lottery application process be chosen 
from a list of foreign countries with a low level of immigration to the United States in the preceding five 
years and that the applicant have at least a high school diploma). 
As a consequence of all of these proposed changes, the Commission recommended that a "modest reduction 
in the level of immigration" be made to "about 550,000 per year" (or by about 30 percent below the then-
existing ceiling in 1997 which remains the current ceiling in 2009) [Commission (1997, p. XIX]. 
With respect to illegal immigration, the Commission acknowledged that "illegal immigration continues to 
be a problem." It recommended the enactment of a "comprehensive strategy" based on enhanced border 
management to prevent illegal entries; improved worksite enforcement of the ban on employment of illegal 
immigrants; and speedy removal of those illegal immigrants apprehended within the country [Commission 
(1997), p. 103]. In passing, it is worth noting that there is no mention by the Commission of any need for 
another amnesty (or "pathway to citizenship") for those illegal immigrants currently living and/or working 
in the country as being part of this "comprehensive strategy." 
The Commission also stated its adamant opposition "to the implementation of a large-scale" guest worker 
program for lesser-skilled and unskilled workers" [Commission (1997), p.94]. 
And lastly, the Jordan Commission articulated the standard that "a credible" immigration policy must meet 
if it is to truly serve the national interest: "people who should get in do get in; people who should not get 
in are kept out; and people who are judged deportable are required to leave" [Commission (1997, p.59]. It 
cannot be said any better. 
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